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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
YV. P. HARLIN CONSTRUCTION ) 
COl\IP ANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Case No. 
v. 10773 
U'l'AH STATE ROAD COl\11\lIS-
SION, Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST;1TEl\'lENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant brought suit against the respondent, 
setting forth three separate causes of action, wherein 
it was alleged that the respondent had breached certain 
contracts between the parties, which contracts involved 
the construction of certain portions of Interstate 15 
projects. The present appeal challenges only the validity 
of the pretrial court's dismissal of appellant's first cause 
of action. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
In a pretrial order (R. 70, 71, and 72), the pre-
trial court, the Honorable A.H. Ellett, dismissed appel-
lant's first cause of action. A motion for reconsideration 
of the pretrial order ( R. 73-81 ) was also denied by the 
pretrial court (R. 86). A petition for interlocutory 
appeal was subsequently denied by this court. 
Prior to trial, appellant's motion to amend the pre-
trial order and to permit a trial of the first cause of 
action (R. 91, 92) was argued by the parties before the 
trial court, and this motion was also denied. Trial then 
proceeded on the second and third causes of action set 
forth in the appellant's complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the dismissal of appel· 
lant's first cause of action should be affirmed. 
STATElVIENT OF FACTS 
Because of the numerous references to the record 
that are intertwined into respondent's arguments, the 
following statement of facts will merely attempt to set 
forth those facts basic to the dispute. 
The parties entered into a contract for the con· 
struction of certain Interstate 15 overpass structures 
at Second South and Eighth \Vest, Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 1). As a prerequisite to 
2 
the construction of these structures, pilings to support 
the foundations of the structures were to be driven. The 
State of Utah Standard Specifications for Road and 
Bridge Construction, which were incorporated into and 
which constituted a part of the construction contract 
(R. 9), set forth in detail the manner and equipment 
to be used by the contractor when driving pile ( R. 7, 9) . 
A minimum energy rating of 18,000 pounds per blow 
was also established ( R. 9). 
Appellant attempted to use a combustion type 
hammer, known as a Del lVIag D-12 on the project, and 
respondent refused to permit appellant the use of this 
hammer. This refusal constituted appellant's first cause 
of action which was dismissed at the pretrial stage of 
the proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DIS~IISSAL OF APPELLANT'S 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AT THE PRE-
TRIAL STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
WAS 'i\TITIIIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE 
PRETRIAL COURT. 
Because of the primary philosophy of Utah R. Civ. 
P.10, i.e., the simplification and reduction to triable 
i~sucs, only those issues which present a real controversy, 
it must be acknowledged that the pretrial court is vested 
11ith authority and also an obligation to dismiss a cause 
3 
of action where it is clear and apparent that the cause 
of action presents no real controversy. As stated in IA 
Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 
1 
§ 471, at 830 (Rules ed. 1960): 
[Two of the four general purposes of the pre- I 
trial rule areJ 1. to identify, designate and clarify 
1 
the true issues and eliminate the apparent issues 
which present no real controversy, land,] 2. to 
off er a convenient opportunity for disposing of 
preliminary matters, such as dismissal ... judg· 
ment .... 
It is further stated in IA Barron and Holtzoff, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 483, at 846 (Rules 
ed. 1960): 
A judgment of dismissal may be rendered 
where the admitted facts disclose fatal defects of 
jurisdiction or that there is no claim for relief 
upon which judgment can be granted. 
The general rule also enunciated in 3 Moore, Fed· 
eral Practice§ 16.11, at 1115 (2d ed. 1966): 
The pretrial conferences enable the parties, 
under the mediation of the court, to crystallize 
these issues and eliminate those which are not con· 
troverted or which use of the deposition and dis· 
covery procedure has shown to be without merit. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In Wirtz v. Young's Electric Sign Co., 315 F.2d 
326 (10th Cir. 1963), the court stated, 315 F.2d at 327: 
Summary disposition of a cause may logically 
and properly follow a pretrial conference when 
the pretrial procedure has disclosed the lack of 
4 
a disputed issue of material fact and the fact so 
established indicate an unequivocal right to judg-
ment favoring a party. 
Also, in Silvera v. Broadway Dep't Store, Inc., 
J5 F. Supp. G25 ( S.D. Cal., 19410), the court stated, 
35 F. Supp. at 627: 
The court has power under pretrial rule No. 16 
to dismiss ·when the facts submitted and proved 
show no cause of action. 
Therefore, as a general proposition, a pretrial court 
may, when the record discloses an issue which presents 
no real controversy, dismiss the cause of action based on 
that issue. 
However, the record in the instant case indicates 
that the dismissal of appellant's first cause of action at 
the pretrial hearing actually constituted a granting by 
the pretrial court of respondent's motion for summary 
judgment. The record discloses that the respondent filed 
a motion for summary judgment (R. 48) with support-
ing affidavits (R. 49, 50, 50A and 50B). Appellant also 
tiled a motion for summary judgment and a traverse 
to defendant's motion for summary judgment (R. 51) 
with supporting affid~n-its ( R. 53 and 54). Memoranda 
iu support of the respective motions were submitted 
(R. 60-64 and 65-69). The record further disclosed that 
respondent served notice on the appellant that the 
respondent's motion for summary judgment would be 
ninde at the pretrial hearing (R. 47). Based on the 
rceord, it is apparent that the dismissal of appellant's 
5 
first cause of action was tantamount, if not in fact , 
a granting by the pretrial court of the respondent's 
motion for summary judgment. 
The propriety of a pretrial court to grant a sum-
mary judgment was considered by the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey in Sheild v. Welch, 4 N.J. 563, 73 A.2d 
536 (19~0). The court stated, 4 N.J. at 566, 73 A.2dat 
537: 
It is further observed that at the pretrial con-
ference memorandum of law were directed to be 
submitted to the court; that such memoranda 
in which the party stated their respective posi-
tions and their impressions of the applicable law 
were accordingly filed; that the memorandum 
filed by the defendant concluded with the follow· 
ing statement: 'We retspectfully submit that 
plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment, but that 
her action should be dismissed and no cause 
entered, and that thereafter the court entered 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 
Thus it appears that the opportunity to fully 
argue the substantive question was availed of by 
the respective parties. The court concluded that 
the case resolve itself into a question of law and 
accordingly entered summary judgment for the 
defendant. [Emphasis added.] 
The court concluded, 4 N.J. at 567, 73 A.2d at 538: 
We agree with the county court, for. reas~ns 
hereinafter stated, that the only questions m· 
volved in the pretrial conference was one of law. 
Under such circumstances and in view of the fact 
that the substantive question was fully presenter! 
to the court by the respective parties we find no 
6 
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procedural impropriety in the court's hearing of 
a summary judgment. 
It is respectfully submitted that the pretrial court's 
dismissal of plaintiff's first cause of action was in fact 
:, granting of respondent's motion for summary judg-
ment. Therefore, as stated in 6 .Moore, Federal Practice 
i;)U.27(1), at 2973 (2d ed. 1966): 
YVhere a timely appeal is taken from an appeal-
able order granting summary judgment, the 
~Lppellate cour-C in reviewing must determine 
whether there is any genuine issue of material 
fact underlying the adjudication, and, if not, 
whether the substant of law was correctly applied. 
Based on the following arguments, respondent 
respectfully submits that the dismissal of appellant's 
'.irst cause of action by the pretrial court was proper 
because of the failure of that issue to present a real 
contro-;rersy aed also because of the failure of that issue 
to present a disputed issue of material fact. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT'S ALLEGATIONS SET 
FORTII TO ESTABLISH A BREACII OF 
CONTRACT ON TIIE PART OF TI-IE RE-
~~PONDENT DO NOT, AS A :MATTER OF 
LA \V, CONSTITUTE A DISPUTED MATE-
RL\_L ISSUE OF FACT. 
Appellant has relied on several theories and allega-
tious to establish the existence of a disputed material 
7 
issue of fact. Each allegation will be rebutted by the 
respondent and the record. 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
Appellant alleges that the Del Mag D-12 com-
bustion type hammer that appellant sought to use on the 
subject project was used and accepted by the respon-
dent on a prior project identified as the 21st South 
project (R. 2, IO, 17, and 34). Because of this prior 
use, appellant contends that the respondent is now 
estopped from denying appellant the privilege of using 
the same hammer on the present project. The general 
rules governing the applications of the doctrines of 
estoppel as applied to a state or state agency are set 
forth in Annot. I A.L.R.2d 338, 360 ( 1948) : 
Generally speaking, the doctrine of estoppel 
will not be a pp lied against any governmental 
agency such as a commission or a board acting 
in its public capacity. 
The rule is further stated in 28 Am. J ur. 2d, Estop· 
pel and Waiver, § 123, at 784 ( 1966): 
Thus, as a general rule, the doctrine of estoppel 
will not be applied against the state in its gov· 
ernmental, public, or sovereign capacity .... 
It is elementary that the construction, maintenance, 
and repair of a highway system is a governmental func· 
tion. Villages of Eden and Hazelton v. Idaho Bd. of 
Highway Directors, 83 Idaho 554, 367 P .2d 294 ( 1961); 
State v. State Comm'n of Revenue and Taxation, 163 
8 
Kan. 240, 181 P.2d 532 ( 1947) ; Almond v. Gilmer, 
188 Va. 822, 51 S.E.2d 272 (1949); Yarrow v. State, 
:HS P.2d 687 (Cal. 1960); 40 C.J.S., Highways, § 177 
(1945). 
Equally well established is the doctrine that the 
state, when acting in its goYernmental capacity, cannot 
be estopped notwithstanding the unauthorized acts of 
its agent. State v. Jacobi, 73 Ariz. 193, 239 P.2d 1081 
(1952); Wheeler v. Santa Ana, 181 P.2d 373 (Cal. 
1947). 
In Main v. Dep't of Highways, 206 Va. 143, 142 
S.E.2d 524 ( 1965), plaintiffs contended that during the 
preparation of their bid, representatives of the defendant 
had assured them that a number of sources of select 
material located within the roadway limits would be of 
iufficient "CBR value" and of suitable quality to be 
employed for the select material requirements of the 
contract. Relying on the representations, the plaintiffs 
submitted a bid totalling a certain amount. Subse-
quently, defendant notified plaintiffs that the material 
11as unsuitable and that plaintiffs would be obligated 
to secure select material outside the designated area. To 
do this, the plaintiffs incurred additional costs not 
ref-l.ected in the original bid submitted to the defendant. 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had waived 
and was estopped to invoke those certain contractual 
provisions which authorized the defendant to direct the 
pl:iintiffs to obtain a new source of select material. 
The court held, 206 Va. at 150, 142 S.E.2d at 529: 
9 
But, aside from this, it is well settled that the 
doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the rights 
of a state when acting in its sovereign or govern. 
mental capacity. I 
The plaintiffs' complaint was accordingly dismissed. I 
In the instant case, appellant alleges that respond-
ent is estopped because of appellant's use of the com-
bustion type hammer on a prior project, to presently 
insist on compliance with the contractual provision that 
requires a mutual agreement between the contractor and 
respondent's chief structural engineer for the use of a 
combustion type hammer on a project prior to the actual 
use of this type hammer. As supported by the authori· 
ties, such an argument is untenable as a matter of law. 
In addition to the general principles stated above, 
it must be noted that, even assuming arguendo that 
appellant's combustion type hammer was used on a prior 
project, the record reveals that this prior use was not 
accomplished or pursuant to the contractual provisions. 
The State of Utah Standard Specifications for Road 
and Bridge Construction, § 5-10.2, provide: 
Combustion type pile hammers may be used 
in lieu of air or steam hammers, provided a rating 
(energy per blow) mu,tually agreed upon bJJ th.e 
contractor and the chie.f structural engineer is 
established prior to use. [Emphasis added.] 
In response to respondent's interrogatories, appel-
lant answered ( R. 34) : 
10 
The acceptance was oral and occurred by rea-
son of the fact that the defendant was informed 
of the use of the Del .Mag D-12 hammer .... 
This answer conclusively establishes that a mutual 
agreement was not effectuated between the contractor 
and respondent's chief structural engineer prior to the 
use of the Del Mag D-12 combustion type hammer on 
the prior project. Rather, respondent was merely "in-
formed of the use." 
A further indication of the noncompliance with 
the above-quoted section of the State of Utah Standard 
Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction is 
appellant's further answer to respondent's interrogatory 
that, "Maurice Anderson and Ray Behling, employees 
of the defendant, approved this use" (R. 34). The above_ 
quoted section specifically requires that the agreement 
be between the contractor and the respondent's chief 
strudural engineer. Now here is it alleged in the record 
that the prior use of appellant's combustion type ham-
mer was pursuant to a mutual agreement with respond-
ent's chief structural engineer prior to the actual use 
of the hammer. Neither of the two employees alleged 
by appellant to have approved the use of appellant's 
hammer on the prior project occupied the position of 
chief structural engineer of respondent at the time the 
alleged approval was given. This court may take judi-
cial notice of the official records of the Utah State Road 
C onunission and conclude neither employee, in fact. 
occupied the position of respondent's chief structural 
engineer. Borrson v. IJf issouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 172 
11 
S.,V.2d 835 (.Mo. 1943) ; State v. Fischer, 17 Wis.2<l 
141, 115 N.,V. at 553 ( 1962) ; American Fork Irr. t'. 
Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 188 ( 1951). 
Therefore, the appellant may not rely on the alleged 
prior approval of respondent as a basis for presently 
estopping respondent from permitting appellant to use 
the hammer on the present project because the contrac-
tual provisions in force at the time were not complied 
with when the prior approval was allegedly given. 
Appellant cites the dissent in State v. Northwest 
1lfagnesite Co., 28 Wash.2d 1, 182 P.2d 643 (1947), 
as establishing the general rule. However, respondent 
submits the rule is more accurately stated by the major· 
ity, 28 Wash.2d at 28, 182 P.2d at 657: 
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked to 
enforce the promise of an officer or agent against 
a corporation or government, if such representa· 
tive person had no legal capacity or power to 
enter into such an obligation. 
Appellant also fails to recognize that the legal 
entity which was the recipient of the alleged prior ap· 
proval is not the same legal entity that is presently 
attempting to gain the benefits of the alleged prior 
approval. A more flagrant shortcoming of appellant's 
argument is that the argument fails to recognize the 
obvious possibility, and in fact the probability, that the 
actual construction sites and conditions, such as sub· 
terranean conditions, would vary greatly between the 
two projects. Therefore, appellant cannot claim a justi· 
12 
ficd reliance on the alleged prior approval of the use 
of the combustion type hammer as being tantamount to 
and a basis for estopping the respondent from subse-
quently refusing to allow the use of the combustion 
type hammer on the present project. 
It must also be noted that the cases cited by appel-
lant do not support his position. In Tanner v. Provo 
Reservoir Co., 76 Utah 335, 289 Pac. 151 (1930); 
I. X. L. Stores v. Success Mkt., 98 Utah 160, 97 P.2d 
577 ( 1939) ; Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 
731 ( 1938) and Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 
15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 ( 1964), appellant must 
concede that the issue of applying the doctrine of estop-
pel to governmental agencies is not discussed. The cases 
are, therefore, immaterial as to the present consideration. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted, that appel-
lant's allegation of equitable estoppel must be denied 
as a matter of law. 
'¥AIVER 
Respondent submits that the proposition that the 
state may waive a contractual condition is not applicable 
to the present factual situation. As stated in 28 Am. 
Jur., Estoppel and TVaiver, § 157, at 840 (1966): 
Voluntary choice is of the very essence of 
waiver. It is a voluntary act which implies the 
ehoice by the party to . . . forego some right or 
advantage which he might at his option have 
demanded and insisted on. 
13 
It is further stated in 28 Am.J ur., Estoppcl and 
Waiver, § 158, at 842 ( 1966) : 
T 
Indeed, the essence of a waiver, as indicated 
by its definition, is the voluntary and intentional 
relinquish1nent of a known right. lEmphasis 
added.] 
If appellant is attempting to apply the doctrine 
of waiver to the alleged prior approved use of appel· 
lant's combustion type hammer on the 21st South proj· 
ect, it must be noted that the alleged waiver was not 
executed by the only person authorized to waive the con-
tractually established requirement. In any event, such 
a prior waiver of the contractual condition would not 
apply to the subsequent independent contract and proj-
ect. A waiver does not relate forward to affect future 
agreements, and a present waiver of a certain contrac-
tual condition does not operate as a prospective waiver 
of all similar future conditions. 28 Am. J ur. 2d, Estop-
pel and Waiver,§ 157 (1966). 
To allege that the doctrine of waiver of the con· 
tractual condition a pp lies to the present construction 
contract and project is to ignore the fact that the basis 
of the present controversy between appellant and re-
spondent stems from the refusal of the respondent to 
allow appellant the use of the combustion type hammer 
on the present project. 
Under all considerations, the doctrine of waiYer 
must be denied as a matter of law. 
14 
PRIOR AGREE.MENT OF THE STATE 
Respondent submits that appellant's allegations 
concerning a prior agreement by respondent have been 
sufficiently answered in the considerations of appellant's 
contentions of equitable estoppel and waiver of condi-
tions. However, it must be noted that nothing in the 
record indicates a prior agreement between appellant 
and respondent's chief structural engineer applicable 
to the present construction contract and project. The 
prior agreement alleged by appellant is obviously the 
alleged prior agreement given at the 21st South project. 
This contention, having previously been answered, must 
also fail as a matter of law. 
BREACH O:F CONTRACT 
The State of Utah Standard Specifications for 
Road and Bridge Construction, §5-10.2, require a mutual 
agreement between the contractor and respondent's chief 
structural engineer establishing the energy rating of a 
eombustion type hammer before that type hammer may 
be used on a project. In Murphy v. Salt Lake City, 
65 Utah 295, 236 Pac. 680 ( 1925) , the contractor alleged 
that the architect had arbitrarily and capriciously re-
fused to inspect a certain type terra cotta proposed by 
the contractor to be utilized in the construction of the 
contract project. This court concluded that the facts 
fell within the category whereby a contractor may fur-
nish or be allowed to use a substitute article of a similar 
nature to the particular articles specified in the contract, 
15 
provided that the substitution be approved by the owner 
or another designated person. On this basis, the court 
concluded, 65 Utah at 303, 236 Pac. at 683: 
That under l this situationJ the owner is entitled 
to the article stipulated for unless he or the per· 
so11 11amed approves a substitute, and in approv· 
ing or in refusing to approve a substitute, the 
judgrnent of the owner or person narned must 
prevail unless he acts in bad faith. A mere error 
of judgment in that regard is not sufficient to 
entitle the contractor to relief at the hands of a 
court of justice. lEmphasis added.] 
In answer to respondent's interrogatory 1-C of 
set II (Supp. R. 147), appellant conceded that there 
was no '·bad faith" on the part of the respondent's chief 
structural engineer in the rejection of appellant's com· 
bus ti on type hammer ( R. 44) . Therefore, by appellant's 
own admission that the respondent's chief structural 
engineer acted without "bad faith," appellant's alleged 
breach of contract must fail as a matter of law. This 
doctrine, that a contracting party is entitled to that 
which is contracted for, and that the refusal to allow 
a substitute will not give rise to a cause of action unless 
that refusal is grounded on bad faith, is well supported 
by the authorities. McGrath v. Electrical Constr. Co., 
370 P.2d 231 (Ore. 1962); Benjamin Foster Co. v. 
Commonwealth, 61 N.E.2d 147 (Mass. 1945). 
This court, in Campbell Bld,q. Co. v. Slate Rd. 
Comm'n, 92 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937), state!!. 
95 Utah at 266, 70 P.2d at 868: 
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'Vhen the parties to a contract agree that the 
architect or engineer or other person shall exer-
cise pmver of decision, the courts v;ill uphold such 
as valid and the decision must stand unless shown 
to have been made arbitrarily or in bad faith. 
As stated above, appellant admitted that the re-
spondent's chief structural engineer did not act in a 
manner allowing a finding that the actions constituted 
bad faith. Generally, to act arbitrarily, includes the 
element of bad faith. As stated in Goodrum v. State, 
158 S.,V.2d 81, 86 (Tex. 1942): 
The word 'arbitrary' has been used on numer-
ous occasions by our courts in defining the type 
of conduct which would prevent the decision of 
an architect or engineer from becoming final and 
has been expressly held to contemplate 'bad faith.' 
It is defined as failure to exercise an honest judg-
ment. [Emphasis added.] 
The court further stated, 158 S.W. 2d at 87: 
[arbitrary is further defined as] fixed or done 
capriciously or at pleasure; without adequate 
determining principle ... nonrational; not done 
or acting according to reason or judgment ... 
tyrannical; despotic. 
It may not be said that the respondent's chief 
structural engineer acted in any manner that may be 
considered arbitrary. For example, the record indicates 
('!le reason why respondent's chief structural engineer 
rtict not accept the manufacturer's energy rating of 
appellant's combustion type hammer. This was because 
tlw California Division of Highways had rated appel-
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lant's hammer at 16,500 foot pounds per blow or ap-
proximately '1'5 percent of the manufacturer's rating of 
22,500 foot pounds (R. 50A). Appellant concedes that 
the energy rating requirement on the subject construc-
tion project was 18,000 foot pounds per blow (R. IO). 
To acknowledge respondent's chief structural engineer's 
awareness of the California Division of Highways' 
energy rating of plaintiff's combustion type hammer to 
be 75 percent of the manufacturer's rating, but to insist 
that respondent's chief structural engineer should have 
nonetheless authorized the use of appellant's combustion 
type hammer on the project, would be a prohibitiou 
against respondent's chief structural engineer utilizing 
his best judgment based on his experience, expertise and 
other known facts. In light of the respondent's chief 
structural engineer's knowledge, rejection of the appel-
lant's combustion type hammer was not only an exercise 
cf good judgment, but also mandatory by the terms of 
i.:he contract which provided an energy rating of 18,000 
foot pounds per blow. The statement found at page 
eleven of appellant's brief that, "Furthermore, the State 
admitted and recognized that the D-12 hammer ha<l a 
proper rating," is completely erroneous. Respondent's 
chief structural engineer agreed that the manufacturer's 
rating was 22,500 foot pounds per blow, but disagreed 
with the manufacturer's rating in light of the ratiug 
given the combustion type hammer of appellant by tk 
California Division of Highways (R. 50A). 
The issues to whether respondent's chief structural 
engineer acted arhi trarly must be examined not onl~- iu 
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light of the chief structural engineer's knowledge and 
expertise, but also in light of the total circumstance that 
surrounded the rejection of appellant's combution type 
hammer. 
Appellant, in response to respondent's interroga-
tory l(A) (Supp. R. 146), answered: 
The very facts surrounding the test indicated 
that they were inaccurate, speculative and im-
material. All of those present could see or should 
have realized that the tests were inaccurate, 
speculative and immaterial. (R. 44.) 
However, appellant also answered respondent's 
interrogatory 3 (Supp. R. 147) : 
Nothing was presented at that particular time, 
other that the fact that the defendant had ap-
proved the use on another job and the fact that 
the manufacturer had made this particular rating. 
(R. 45.) 
'Vhere the pretrial court concluded that, although 
appellant alleged various inconsistencies in the conduct 
of the test of appellant's combusion type hammer, the 
admitted fact that nothing was done by appellant at that 
time, either in the form of proffered facts, evidence, 
suggestions, or proposed tests, appellant's allegation of 
arbitrary action must fail as a matter of law, such con-
clusion is not only logically mandatory, but also legally 
required. Although appellant now screams arbitrary un-
fairness, appellant took no such position at the vital time 
of the consideration of the fitness of appellant's com-
bustion type hammer. To presently allege arbitrary 
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action, but to admit that at the time the alleged arbitrar.1 
action occurred, nothing was pursued by appellant to 
illustrate the arbitrary nature of the action is entireh· 
inconsistent. The failure of appellant to object to tl;l I 
proposed test or in any manner present additional eri I 
dence or proposals bars appellant from presently re-
covering on the basis of such a claim. 3 J\'.IcBride and 
'Vachtel, Government Contract,§ 2IA0(12) (196ti). 
Further recognition must be given to the fact that 
before the energy rating of appellant's combustion type 
hammer is to be consistent with that of other type of 
hammers, the combustion type hammer must be aLle 1 
to drive piling to an equivalent depth as an air or stcalll 
hammer which has the same energy rating, i.e., the abilil) 
of the diesel hammer to penetrate the ground at critical 
depths of the construction site must be equivalent to that 
of the other type of pile hammers. If the ability of the 
combustion type hammer to penetrate the soil were lcso 
the contract provision requiring a pile to be driven until 
it offers a specified resistance to the blow of the pile 
hammer would be complied with, but the pile would be 
at a more shallow depth with resulting less bearing 
capacity. As the record indicates (R. 50A): 
The specifications for pile driving equipment 
furnished on the west Salt Lake freeway projects 
require a pile hammer capacity of not less ti.mu 
18,000 foot pounds per blow. In addition, a mm1· 
mum blow count is required which exceeds the 
hlow eouut required by the standard pile driYing 
formulas for a Q'iven capacity. The intent of tk·': 
1 
requirements is to insure pile penetration n! : 
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dense but thin lenses of sand which are inter-
spersed in soft material. These sand lenses might 
support a pile driven with a pile hammer of lesser 
capacity, or where lesser blow count is required, 
but would not properly support a cluster of piles. 
Appellant may contend that these statement by 
the respondent's chief structural engineer may be re-
butted at a trial of this issue on the merits. However, 
such an argument totally fails to recognize that the 
eritical determination to be made is whether respondent's 
chief structural engineer acted in bad faith or arbitrarily. 
Therefore, the knowledge and expertise of respondent's 
1 chief structural engineer is precisely what that determi-
nation depends on. The record is clear that the actions 
taken by respondent's chief structural engineer in refus-
ing appellant the use of the combustion type hammer 
on the subject project must be held to be as a matter 
of law, reasonable and free from all allegations of arbi-
trariness. 
Appellant submits that Midgley v. Campbell Bldg. 
Co., 38 Utah 293, 112 Pac. 820 (1911), supports his 
position. However, in that case, the articles furnished 
, by a subcontractor and which were rejected by the super-
Yising architects, 38 Utah at 299, 112 Pac. at 822: 
... were in accordance with the plans, details, 
and specifications prepared by the supervising 
architect, and were in quality and character in 
every way equal to the requirements of the plans, 
details, and specifications, and that they fell short 
in the circumstance only that they were supplied 
by and purchased from Crane and Company 
instead of Clowe & Sons .... 
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The fact situation in Midgley v. Campbell Bldy. 
Co., supra, is completely opposite to the fact situation 
of the instant case. The instant case is not concerned with 
the proposition that appellant's combustion type ham-
mer admitte<lly complied in every manner with the spc· 
cifications. Rather, the record is clear that the reasonable 
concern of respondent's chief structural engineer was 
that the combustion type hammer would not, in fact, 
comply with the specifications of the contract. Therefore, 
the cited case is not authority for appellant's position. 
Appellant also cites Davies v. Kahn, 251 F.2d 324, 328 
( 1958), for the proposition that "An architect has no 
inherent power to insist on an article of particular manu-
facture, not specified in the contract over one that in all 
respects responds to the contract." Again, this case does 
not support appellant's position because of respondent's 
chief structural engineer's conclusion that the appellant's 
combustion type hammer did not respond to the contract 
specifications. 
The primary consideration in determining whether 
respondent breached the subject contract by and through 
the refusal of respondent's chief structural engineer tu 
mutually agree to the use by appellant of the combustion 
type hammer on the project is whether respondent's chief 
structural engineer acted in bad faith or arbitrarily. 
Recognition must be given to respondent's chief struc· 
tural engineer's admitted knowledge and expertise. The 
record is clear that respondent's chief structural engi-
neer was aware of an official state energy rating that was 
in fact 75 percent that of the manufacturer of appel· 
22 
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Jant's combustion type hammer energy rating. It may 
uot be said that, in light of this knowledge and expertise, 
respondent's chief structural engineer acted arbitrarily. 
Appellant's contention must fail as a matter of law. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENY-
ING APPELLANT'S l\J.:OTION POR RECON-
SIDERATION AND AMENDMENT OP THE 
PRETRIAL ORDER. 
Respondent agrees that in certain instances, modi-
fication of a pretrial order should be allowed to prevent 
a manifest injustice. However, such was not the case 
in the instant matter. Appellant fails to recognize that 
no issue or contention in addition to the issues and con-
tentions considered by the pretrial court were presented 
to the court in motion for reconsideration. In other 
words, the pretrial court was merely asked to reconsider 
lhe issues and contentions that it had previously con-
sidered at the pretrial hearing and reverse its conclusion. 
No authority is cited by appellant, and indeed no author-
ity could be cited by appellant, sustaining the proposi-
tion that once a pretrial order has been entered, a motion 
hr an allegedly aggrieved party to the pretrial court 
merely asking the court to reconsider its conclusions, 
automatically works as a basis on which the pretrial 
rirdcr may be reversed. In light of the fact that no new 
issue or contention was presented to the pretrial court 
at the motion for reconsideration, the pretrial court 
23 
merely adhered to the conclusions that had previous!) 
been reached. This does not constitute error. 
Appellant's brief, at page 27, states, "The pretrial 
court and trial court lhave] thus effectively preventer! 
any amendments to the pleadings, and turned the pre-
trial into a summary judgment proceeding without 
proper notice, or legal factual basis." However, the rec-
ord clearly establishes that respondent gave notice to 
appellant that respondent's motion for summary judg· 
ment would be made before the court at the time or 
pretrial ( R. 47) . 
POINT IV. 
DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION AT THE PRETRIAL 
STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS DID N01 
CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF APPEL 
LANT'S RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. 
Appellant's argument totally disregards the nn 
ture of a dismissal of a cause of action for the failur1 
of the issues presented to present a real controversy 01 
a disputed material issue of fact. As stated in 6 Moore 
Federal Practice,§ 56.06(2), at 2080: 
If the only question involved in the litigatior 
is one of law and there is no dispute as to mate1:1:1 
issues of fact, there is no room for a conte11t1m 
by the losing party that the granting of t.h: 
motion for summary judgment deprives it (If: 
jury trial. 
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The above-quoted proposition is supported by the 
;reat weight of authority. To support appellant's con-
tention \Vould be to completely hold void such rules of 
rrocedure as Utah R. Civ. P. 12 (b), 12 ( c), and 56. The 
dttire philosophy on which the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
tedure is based is to allow, " ... the just, speedy and in-
expensive determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. 
P. I. 'Vhen the record discloses that the issues are not 
meritoriously presented, i.e., the issues fail to raise a 
1lisputed material issue of fact, it becomes the court's 
obligation to dismiss the cause of action based on those 
tssues. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the 
rtismissal of appellant's first cause of action was proper 
and in accord with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
, and appellant's arguments must be denied as a matter 
' of law. 
l I 
I 
I 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that each allegation relied on 
by appellant to justify a trial of appellant's first cause 
of action on the merits has been rebutted. Each and 
every allegation must be denied as a matter of law and 
under no theory could appellant recover against the 
respondent at a trial on the merits. It is, therefore, 
respectfully submitted that the dismissal of appellant's 
first cause of action should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GARY A. FRANK 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
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